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A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL
TERM LIMITS: IMPROVING REPRESENTATIVE
LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
James C. Otteson*
INTRODUCTION
"Throw the bums out!"' was a rallying cry among American voters during
the congressional elections of 1990. One angry voter organized a grassroots
movement to get rid of incumbents, whom he blamed for a variety of govern-
mental failures.' Others have suggested campaign finance reforms and even
term limitations' as solutions to the incumbency "problem." Despite this popu-
* B.S., Brigham Young University, 1988; J.D., Yale University, 1991; Law Clerk to the Hon-
orable Byron J. Johnson, Idaho Supreme Court, 1991-92. I am especially grateful for the help and
encouragement of Professor Akhil Amar. I would also like to thank the following people for help-
ful comments and advice on earlier drafts: Bruce Ackerman, Susan Christian, Steve Hardy, Kelly
Patterson, Jeff Shumway, Emily Sims, Stan Soper, and Rod Ward. I would also like to thank my
wife Deborah for her enduring help and support.
1. Out of Order!. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 22, 1990, at 28.
2. Jack Gargan, founder of T.H.R.O., Inc. (Throw the Hypocritical Rascals Out!), described
his frustration with government by exclaiming, "I'M APPALLED . ..BITTER ...OUT-
RAGED ...INCENSED ...LIVID ...SHOCKED ... [and] REALLY HACKED OFF
... NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 10, 1990, at 40 (advertisement). Mr. Gargan continued in his
grassroots petition:
BUT I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE IN TO THOSE CLOWNS! Maybe one person
can't make a difference, but you and I together can! And here's what we must do:
The root of all of our problems is elected officials who use their incumbency to put a
stranglehold on their office. They devote most of their time and energy to raising
money for re-election, rather than to running the country properly. I propose that we
simply rise up and VOTE EVERY INCUMBENT SENATOR AND CONGRESS-
MAN OUT OF OFFICE!
Id.
3. Out of Order, supra note I, at 32.
4. Id.; Timothy Egan, Building on Mistrust of Officials, Voters in West Try to Limit Terms,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991 (nat'l ed.), at Al. Indeed, the recent trend among journalists is to link
nearly every point of dissatisfaction with national government to the term limitation movement.
See, e.g, David Broder, Term-Limits Juggernaut May Flatten Some Unintended Victims, CH.
TRID., Oct. 17, 1991, § 1, at 27 (op-ed) ("Fed by the fury at the Senate's late-night pay raise, the
House check-bouncing scandal and even the gruesome Clarence Thomas hearings, the term-limits
movement is running ... strongly .... ); William Neikirk, Poisonous Politics Erodes Citizens'
Faith, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1991, § 1, at 1, 4 ("Term limitation, once considered a fringe idea,
gains in political respectability with each new scandal or with each new failure by Congress and
the Bush administration to deal with pressing domestic issues ...."); William Safire, Hail to the
House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991 (nat'l ed.), at Al 3 (op-ed) ("Term limitation is the specter that
is haunting the House, and scandal is the two-by-four that gets the attention of the most mulish
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list fervor and its accompanying debate on editorial pages across America,
over 96% of both House and Senate incumbents were reelected in 1990.5
Many people still believe that some sort of congressional election reform is
necessary. 6 Voters seem to love their individual representatives while they hate
Congress. This ambivalent relationship between Congress and the people
reveals a sense that our government has a deep, systemic problem, but both
Congress and the people lack the will to do anything about it.
Without diminishing its importance, the popular "feeling" that Congress is
inept is not enough to justify a radical change such as limiting congressional
terms. A more rational and deliberate dialogue is needed to muster deep and
broad popular support to change the Constitution. Indeed, to consider limiting
congressional tenure is to consider changing the very legal and institutional
framework by which laws themselves are made. Such a proposal should be
approached earnestly and thoughtfully by both the "everyday" people of
America and the political and intellectual elite.7
This Article is intended as a step in the direction of a rational dialogue
about term limits, and contains three stages. Part I lays the interpretive foun-
dation for an institutional analysis of Congress by exploring the theoretical
underpinnings of representative legislation. The Constitution will be explored
textually and historically to discover Congress' original constitutional man-
date. Part I will argue that the Constitution requires representative legislation
to reflect two fundamental principles: legitimacy, meaning that members of
Congress should meet several normative selection criteria; and effectiveness,
meaning that legislation should occur in a procedural framework of legitimacy
and deliberation to create policy that embodies the national interest.8
member.").
5. Chuck Alston, Warning Shots Fired by Voters More Mood Than Moderate, 48 CONG. Q
3797, 3798 (1990).
6. For example, since the 1990 elections, even President Bush has indicated that he will support
both the elimination of political action committees ("PACs"), Maureen Dowd, State of the Union
Address. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at Al, and a constitutional amendment limiting the terms of
members of Congress, Michael Oreskes, Bush Backs Move For Limiting Terms of U.S.
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1990, at Al.
7. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1039 (1984) (discussing the importance of "sustained debate and struggle" among people
when formulating "higher," constitutional legal principles).
8. At this point, I would like to explain why an interpretivist approach is necessary to analyze
and improve representative legislation. I will illustrate by discussing two alternatives to interpreti-
vism. The first alternative is to describe what Congress is doing now as representative legislation,
and let this definition justify Congress' institutional existence. The problem with this circular ap-
proach is one of relativism. If the way in which government is conducted is judged only by prevail-
ing practices, government may devolve into a free-for-all in which Congress may set rules for itself
that progressively deteriorate over time. Textual and historical interpretation provides a more de-
tached standard by which to judge the operation of government.
A second alternative to interpretation is to compile and analyze currently available knowledge
on government and then formulate the "best" modern theory of representative legislation. After
all, why should modern Americans be the prisoners of James Madison and company? The answer
is that using the Constitution's text and history as a standard does not make modern citizens
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The second stage of the analysis (Part II) will measure Congress against
these constitutional standards of legitimacy and effectiveness. The third stage
of the analysis (Parts III, IV, and V) will explore the best way to restore
congressional legitimacy and effectiveness. In Part III, campaign finance re-
form and the judicial regulation of the political process will be criticized as
grossly inadequate solutions to the problem. Part IV will review antifederalist
arguments for a rotation of legislators, and will examine modern proposals for
limiting congressional tenure. Finally, Part V will propose limiting members of
Congress to one term in each House. This Part will argue that the elimination
of the reelection incentive will improve representative legislation by strength-
ening parties, and by giving representatives incentives to solve national
problems through deliberation and cooperation.
I. REPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATION: LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS
A. Starting Points: Article I and the Preamble
One can begin an analysis of Congress as a political institution by asking
two questions: (1) What is Congress supposed to be? and (2) What is Con-
gress supposed to do? Superficially, these questions are answerable with one
sentence: Congress is a representative body that is supposed to make law; that
is, Congress is supposed to engage in representative legislation. Although the
Constitution does not explicitly define representative legislation, a working
definition can be found in the text and history of the Constitution.
Briefly, representative legislation under the Constitution should embrace
two fundamental principles: (a) representative legitimacy, meaning that
elected members of Congress should meet certain normative requirements to
be fully authorized to act for the people; and (b) legislative effectiveness,
meaning that legislation enacted by Congress should further broad national
goals like those stated in the Preamble.9 Although any given law incorporates
a variety of substantive values, effective legislation can be defined as occurring
under certain procedural conditions.
prisoners. One of the great virtues of a constitutional system is that it allows for the self-conscious
revision of government. The best available knowledge can still be used to improve government.
Reference to the Constitution merely ensures that norms that were once endorsed after a rational,
extended debate by a large percentage of the population will not be scrapped just because modern
political and intellectual elites think they know what is "best" for America. Instead, would-be
reformers must get "the People" to thoughtfully consider the old rules and judge them on their
own merits while also examining the reasons the rules were adopted in the first place. See gener-
ally id. (arguing that "the People" hammer out new principles to guide public life after "sus-
tained debate and struggle"). Interpretation thus provides a self-conscious fusion of the present
and the past by which modern people attempt to understand the reasons our government's foun-
ders chose the original rules. See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975)
(exploring the problem of hermeneutics, or the "phenomenon of understanding," which pervades
"all human relations to the world").
9. See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl. The full text of the Preamble is reproduced infra note 21.
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1. What Congress Is Supposed To Be: Explaining Representative
Legitimacy
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution sets forth three nor-
mative requirements for the legitimacy of members of the House of Represent-
atives. The first is that "[tihe House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members ... chosen by the People of the several States."10 The Constitution
mandates that legitimate authority to act requires election by the people; thus,
legitimacy is a function of popular sovereignty. The second requirement is that
"[n]o person shall be a Representative ... who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."1 This residency re-
quirement means that a representative's authoritative legitimacy comes
through election by the people of the district or state in which the representa-
tive lives. The third requirement for representative legitimacy in the House is
that legislators should represent roughly equal numbers of voters, divided geo-
graphically. 2 Proportional representation means that numerically equal
groups of voters should have equal influence in the lawmaking process.'
In short, the Constitution requires that for Congress to be legitimate, its
members must: (1) be elected by the people; (2) come from the districts or
states they represent; and (3) equally represent similarly sized groups of voters
(or in the Senate, equally represent states). Legitimacy is a concept that ex-
presses what Congress is supposed to be. Legitimacy embodies the idea that
Congress derives its authority to make law from the people and the
Constitution.
2. What Congress Is Supposed To Do: Explaining Legislative Effectiveness
The first sentence of Article I of the Constitution provides: "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."' 4
Legislation, which apparently is Congress' primary constitutional task, is de-
fined as "making laws, levying and collecting taxes, and making financial ap-
propriations."' Thus, Congress is supposed to make law,' 6 "lay and collect
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Senators have also been popularly elected
since 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for election of
Senators by state legislatures), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1; THE FEDERALIST No.
57, at 350-51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The elective mode of obtaining
rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.").
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Residency requirements also apply to Sena-
tors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
12. U.S. CO NST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
13. Although theoretically equal, influence between districts is not equal in practice. See infra
note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionate congressional influence of a few
areas of the country). The Senate, of course, is not based on proportional geographic representa-
tion, but rather equality of statehood, as each state is represented by two senators. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Thus, states should have equal influence in the Senate.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. I (emphasis added).
15. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 683 (1986). This modern definition of
legislation is consistent with Congress' enumerated powers in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
[Vol. 41:1
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Taxes,""7 "regulate Commerce," 8 "coin Money,"" 9 and "declare War."20
Yet the Preamble suggests that legislation should do more than just match a
definition. 1 In addition to being a general statement about government, the
Preamble can be read as an admonition to enact effective legislation. Effective
legislation "form[s] a more perfect Union," "insure[s] domestic Tranquility,"
and "promote[s] the general Welfare."2
Most people favor "effective legislation" that "furthers the national inter-
est." However, varying social and ideological values color people's conceptions
of these terms. It seems futile to try to define "effectiveness" and "national
interest." How can the Constitution offer a workable definition of effective
legislation while itself remaining a neutral arbiter of the political process?
This reasoning suggests that legislative effectiveness may be meaningless as a
constitutional principle.
Despite this dilemma, effective legislation is a meaningful goal that is en-
dorsed by both the text and history of the Constitution. Instead of focusing on
the substantive values embodied in policy, the Constitution suggests that legis-
lation can be presumed to be effective if it is made within a framework of two
procedural conditions: (1) by a legitimate legislature (see the definition of le-
gitimacy above); and (2) in a deliberative environment in which representa-
tives discuss substantive issues so that the "national interest" at any given
time will be formed according to the country's substantive needs.2
Representative legitimacy improves the presumptive effectiveness of legisla-
tion in several ways. Requiring the election of lawmakers allows the people to
participate, albeit vicariously, in making policy, which is presumed to reflect
the public good more than if the people had not voted.24 Residency require-
ments for representatives ensure that citizens generally are represented by
those acquainted with their local problems, which, of course, are relevant con-
siderations for "promot[ing] the general Welfare."2 5 Likewise, proportional
art. I, §§ 7-8.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. U.S. Co NsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
20. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
21. The Preamble states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, estab-
lish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. Co NsT. pmbl.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See id.
24. The assumption that legislation is more effective when the people vote for their representa-
tives is grounded in the constitutional amendments expanding suffrage. U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV,
XIX, XXIV, & XXVI. Intuitively, it is difficult to imagine how legislation could "form a more
perfect Union" while relevant members of the Union are denied the right to vote.
25. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Residency requirements do not, however, guarantee the election of rep-
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representation promotes effectiveness by giving equal groups of citizens
roughly equal voices in the political process.2 6
Yet despite its importance for effective legislation, representative legitimacy
itself does not guarantee effectiveness.2 7 Constitutional history demonstrates
that deliberation is also a crucial legislative procedural condition for effective
lawmaking. The development of the constitutional principle of deliberation is
best understood in historical context.
B. The Era of Instruction
1. Legislative Similarity and Proximity to the People
During the decade following Independence, many Americans seemed to be-
lieve that the legislatures ought to be similar and proximate to the people.
John Adams stated, "[The legislature] should be in miniature an exact por-
trait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them."2
Following their experience with the British Parliament, which legislated with-
resentatives who are sensitive to the interests of political minorities within a given district. This
problem, which is a function of the fact that voters are grouped by geography rather than by
another demographic trait, allows local district majorities to continually reelect representatives
who promote the majorities' views in Congress.
26. One should note that perfectly proportional geographic representation does not guarantee
legislative effectiveness for two reasons. First, the geographic dispersal of political minorities
means that their political input will also be dispersed, tending to lessen their influence over legisla-
tion. For example, suppose that political minority X, which is defined by the preference of its
members for legislation banning gasoline-burning vehicles, makes up 20% of the population. One
might suppose that despite its minority status, group X ought to be able to influence legislation in
proportion to its size, leading to at least some regulation (if not an outright ban) of gas-burning
cars. But suppose also that members of group X are relatively well dispersed throughout the coun-
try, so that they make up, at most, only 40% of any given congressional district. This dispersal
makes it unlikely that group X will be able to elect even a small number of legislators to promote
its interests in Congress, which means that gas-burning cars may remain largely unregulated.
The second reason proportional representation cannot guarantee legislative effectiveness has to
do with differences in need among districts of equal political power. Assume that the things dis-
tricts need are called "benefits." Some districts begin the political process already having more
benefits than others. Assuming equal political power between districts (due to proportional repre-
sentation), and assuming districts will use their power to protect the benefits they already have,
one would expect an inertia against the distribution of benefits to needy groups. This is true even
if a majority of people in wealthier districts recognize that "effective" legislation requires redistri-
bution of benefits to needier districts.
27. See supra notes 25-26 (describing the inadequacy of residency requirements and propor-
tional representation for promoting effective legislation).
28. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 165
(1969). George Mason, former Governor of Virginia remarked, "[Representatives] ought to mix
with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel,---ought to be perfectly amenable to them,
and thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition." CECELIA M. KENYON. THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS at lii (1966) (quoting Richard H. Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, in PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 288, 288-89 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1888)). The early
state constitutions also had declarations and controls to make legislatures "like" the people. See
infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (describing such declarations and controls in the Mary-
land, Delaware, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts Constitutions).
[Vol. 41: 1
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out any direct input of the colonists to represent American interests, early
Americans were tired of being represented by people whose interests differed
greatly from their own.2*
This notion of legislative similarity and proximity apparently had demo-
graphic implications, with some people insisting that the legislature should re-
present all professions.8 0 These people argued that a demographically similar
legislature would make good law because it would do what the people would
do if assembled personally.81 Thus, early drafters of the state constitutions
tried to make legislatures as much like the people as possible. 2 However, as
the preratification experience of American state governments illustrates, one of
the problems with the goal of a demographically similar legislature was that it
29. A belief in virtual representation, the theory that certain nonvoting citizens could be ade-
quately represented by legislators elected by other citizens with similar interests, was sometimes
offered as a justification for Parliament's authority over the American colonies. But colonial
Americans reacted strongly against the idea that members of Parliament (for whom the Ameri-
cans did not vote) could virtually represent them, because the colonists' interests were perceived to
differ greatly from those of British subjects across the Atlantic who did vote. For a description of
the American rejection of virtual representation and early thoughts on actual representation, see
WOOD, supra note 28, at 173-88.
30. Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee stated, "[A] fair representation, therefore, should be so
regulated, that every order of men in the community ... can have a share in [the legislature]-in
order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just pro-
portion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature .... KENYON, supra note 28,
at lii (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN
1787, at 32 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1896)).
Hamilton, writing as Publius, responded, ."The idea of an actual representation of all classes of
the people by persons of each class is altogether -visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the
Constitution that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would
never take place in practice." THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at
214.
31. The principle of demographic similarity in a legislature has appeal for the modern pluralis-
tic or interest group theories of politics. Pluralistic legislators implement the predetermined prefer-
ences of relevant groups into legislation, without substantive alteration informed by deliberation.
See Edmund Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 374 (1983). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542 (1988) (exploring the definition of "pluralism" and arguing that the
pluralist system is one of aggregate citizen preferences). Theoretically, an interest group's influ-
ence in a demographic legislature is roughly proportional to its share of demographic representa-
tion. "The promise of pluralism is that the cumulative benefits of majoritarianism-that there will
be more winners than losers-should redound to all relevant groups in society as they form cross-
cutting alliances on different issues." Akhil R. Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery
Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1284 n.4 (1984). Although not achieving complete demographic diver-
sity, a lottery voting system would create a legislature that would proportionally represent groups
defined by constituents' first-choice votes. Demographic representation would depend on the im-
portance voters attached to demography relative to other voting criteria. See generally id. (argu-
ing that lottery voting would come close to creating a proportionately representative legislature).
But cf Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1028 (noting danger of equating legislature with the peo-
ple-something Ackerman calls "mimetic representation").
32. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (describing state constitutional provisions
designed to make legislators more like "the People").
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was unrealistic and unworkable. 8
2. Control of State Legislatures in the Late 1770s
The first state constitutions ratified after the Declaration of Independence
contained numerous declarations and controls to make legislatures more like
the people.84 The Maryland and Delaware Constitutions stated that elections
ought to be "free and frequent,' ' 5 and many early constitutions provided for
annual elections of representatives.8 6 One common device to ensure legislative
similarity was the residency requirement,8 7 and a few constitutions limited leg-
islative tenure. 8 The Pennsylvania Constitution asserted that by limiting ten-
ure, "the danger of establishing an inconvenient aristocracy will be effectually
prevented." 89
Another control on legislatures employed by voting citizens at this time was
the practice of instructing state representatives how to vote on certain legisla-
tive issues.40 "Instruction" reflected the ideals of political equality and partici-
pation, implying that constituents were the political equals of their representa-
tives, and that citizens should be aware of legislative issues and influence
political outcomes. Instruction allowed voters to control the legislature even
33. See THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 214-15 ("The idea
of an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class is altogether vision-
ary ... this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free.")
See generally WOOD, supra note 28 (examining the problems of the "preratification experience").
34. Several state constitutions also made general declarations that governmental power
originated with the people, and not their rulers. See, e.g. DEL. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights,
art. I; MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. I; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. I;
PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. IV.
35. MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. V; DEL. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. V;
see also MASS. CONST. of 1780, Decl. of Rights, art. IX; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art.
VI; PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. VII (all declaring that elections should be free).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. III; PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. II, § 9; VA. CONST. of
1776, para. 3. A common rallying cry of state constitution writers during this time was "Where
ANNUAL ELECTION ends, TYRANNY begins." WOOD, supra note 28, at 166.
37. See. e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I, § 7; VA. CONST. of
1776, para. 3.
38. See PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. 1I, § 8 (prohibiting legislators from serving more than 4
terms in 7 years); VA. COST. of 1776, para. 4 (establishing rotation system for senators); cf THE
FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 241 (concerning tenure limits for gover-
nors). Publius noted, "According to all the [state] constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest
offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and
executive departments, to a period of years." Id.
39. PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. II, § 8.
40. For a description of the practice of instruction between 1776 and 1787, see WOOD, supra
note 28, at 188-96. Some Americans seemed to think that representatives were "mere attorneys of
those who elected them" who "ought to do as they are bid" and who "ought not to prefer their
own private opinions to the judgments of their constituents." Id. at 189.
Although not explicitly mentioning the right to instruct representatives, the early constitutions
of Delaware and Maryland declared that the right of citizens to participate in legislation was "the
foundation of liberty." DEL. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. VI; accord, MD. CONST. of 1776,
Decl. of Rights, art. V.
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when it was not the "exact [demographic] portrait" of the people envisioned
by John Adams.'"
3. The Decline of Instruction
By 1787, some blamed the practice of excessive instruction for a parochial
crisis of public law that threatened to lock the wheels of government. 42 Noah
Webster declared that constituents, "on a view of their local interest," believed
themselves to be "better judges of the propriety of law" than representatives
who had the benefit of reasoned policy debate in the assembly.'" One author
noted that "the use of binding instructions and the growing sense that the
representative was merely a limited agent or spokesman for the local interests
of his constituents in the decade after Independence ate away the independent
authority of the representative and distorted, even destroyed, the traditional
character of representation."" This marked the decline of instruction by
constituents.
41. See WooD, supra note 28, at 165.
Like the eighteenth-century emphasis on demography, instruction is also reminiscent of modern
political pluralism. In both systems, voter preferences are taken as exogenous, predetermined goals
of legislation, and representatives are charged with implementing these preferences without sub-
stantive alteration. Both systems also have majoritarian elements. While Revolutionary represent-
atives responded to local pressure by a majority of the most vocal constituents, see Akhil R.
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043, 1059 (1989); WOOD, supra note 28, at 188-96, modern pluralistic outcomes are determined
by aggregated majority preferences, see Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1543 (arguing that the plural-
istic goal is a system of "aggregate citizen preferences").
The major difference between legislatures of 1780 and modern pluralistic legislatures is that
pressure groups in the former mostly were confined to geographic areas, see WooD. supra note 28,
at 379-89, while modern pluralistic pressure groups can be defined by common economic goals or
demographic traits, as well as by geography. See generally Becker, supra note 31; Sunstein, supra
note 31.
Other aspects of instruction are also reminiscent of modern pluralism. For instance, both sys-
tems downplay deliberation and the possibility of a better solution than can be provided by imple-
menting unreviewed preferences. See Amar, supra, at 1059; Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1544-45;
see also WooD, supra note 28, at 194-95 (noting the mounting criticism of instruction). Similarly,
both systems ignore the possibility that constituent desires might change if ideas could be ex-
changed in a deliberative setting. Cf. Amar, supra note 31, at 1304 n. 11 (asserting that low-cost
exchange is available in legislatures). The fact that preferences may not be debated or filtered also
means that bad preferences may be implemented, like a preference for slavery in the 1770s or
discrimination in the 1990s. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1543-44. Finally, both systems tend to
favor groups which can easily mobilize, regardless of the relative societal importance of their
preferences. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic
Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1583 (1988).
42. Although it may be unclear exactly how many held this view, I will argue that the Federal-
ists believed instruction to be a problem, and that the Constitution was structured to prevent it.
43. WooD, supra note 28, at 380 (quoting Noah Webster, Government, AMERICAN MAGAZINE
205-07 (1787-88)).
44. Id. at 387 (citing Loose Thoughts on Government, in AMERICAN ARCHIvEs 731 (Peter
Force ed., 4th ed. 1837-46)).
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C. The Rise of Deliberation as a Representative Principle
Although some people during and after the framing period continued to ar-
gue for demographic similarity" and the use of instructions,4 6 the Constitution
embodied a legislative philosophy that rejected these principles. One of the
most fundamental concepts associated with representation during this period
was deliberation, by which representatives arrived at legislative decisions
through rational dialogue. 7
From an historical perspective, the role of deliberation in Congress was clar-
ified even more in August 1789, when the House of Representatives debated a
proposed amendment that would have made the instruction of congressmen an
explicit constitutional right of the people.4 The amendment was soundly de-
feated, 9 and the most powerful arguments in opposition focused on how in-
struction would destroy the important deliberative function of Congress."
45. See KENYON, supra note 28, at liii.
46. Several members of the House in the First Congress argued for a constitutional amendment
explicitly granting constituents the right to instruct representatives. Mr. Page argued, "Our Gov-
ernment is derived from the people, of consequence the people have a right to consult for the
common good; but to what end will this be done, if they have not the power of instructing their
representatives? Instruction and representation in a republic appear to me to be inseparably con-
nected . 1..." I ANNALS OF CONG. 762-63 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
47. Publius alludes to the importance of deliberation several times when discussing the mechan-
ics of representation:
On a comparison of the different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in
their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal
legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquain-
tance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with them a
due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to
acquire concerning all the other States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 348-49. This passage demonstrates
the importance of deliberation and discussion in the education of representatives as to the circum-
stances in other states.
Publius also points out that "the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the center
which will barely allow the representatives of the people to meet as often as may be necessary for
the administration of public affairs." THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison), supra note 10, at
100-01. Obviously, the only reason it is "necessary" for representatives to meet is for them to
deliberate. If the legislative process were conducted by instruction, meeting would be unnecessary,
because each district could just send a letter to the capital expressing its views on proposed laws.
Thomas Jefferson recognized the importance of independent, deliberative lawmaking in 1776.
Regarding the creation of the Virginia State Senate, Thomas Jefferson stated, "I had two things
in view: to get the wisest men chosen, and to make them perfectly independent when chosen." 1
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 503 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
48. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 46, at 760-76.
49. The vote on this amendment in the House was 10 votes for and 41 against. Id. at 776.
50. Several statements of representatives in this debate are illuminating. Congressman Hartley
stated:
It appears to my mind, that the principle of representation is distinct from an
agency, which may require written instructions. The great end of meeting is to consult
for the common good; but can the common good be discerned without the object is
reflected and shown in every light. A local or partial view does not necessarily enable
any man to comprehend it clearly; this can only result from an inspection into the
[Vol. 41:1
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The insights into the Framers views on deliberation help illustrate this fa-
mous passage from The Federalist No. 10:
The effect of [representation in a republic] is ... to refine and enlarge the
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citi-
zens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. 1
The Framers hoped to exchange self-interested, instruction based, parochial
politics"' for reasoned decision-making, which would make use of wisdom and
public virtue. Deliberation was closely associated with the idea of public vir-
tue, which required representatives to sacrifice private and constituent agendas
for the good of the whole. 3 Deliberation and public virtue were the means by
which the effective legislation envisioned by the Preamble could be attained.
aggregate ... [p]erhaps a majority of the whole might not be instructed to agree to
any one point, and is it thus the people of the United States propose to form a more
perfect union, provide for the common defence, and promote the general welfare?
I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 46, at 762.
Congressman Clymer stated:
[Instruction] is a most dangerous principle, utterly destructive of all ideas of an inde-
pendent and deliberative body, which are essential requisites in the Legislatures of
free Governments: they prevent men of abilities to the community that are in their
power, destroying the object contemplated by establishing an efficient General Gov-
ernment, and rendering Congress a mere passive machine.
Id. at 763.
Congressman Sherman maintained:
[T]he words [of the amendment] are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying
an idea that they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot
be admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think,
when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet with others from
the different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with them to such acts as are
for the general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by instruc-
tions, there would be no use in deliberation; all that a man would have to do, would be
to produce his instructions, and lay them on the table, and let them speak for him...
. It is the duty of a good representative to inquire what measures are most likely to
promote the general welfare, and, after he has discovered them, to give them his
support.
Id. at 763-64.
Madison added, "I do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can speak the voice of the
people; so far from it, their ideas may contradict the sense of the whole people; hence the conse-
quence that instructions are binding on the representative is of a doubtful, if not of a dangerous
nature." Id. at 767. Interestingly, Madison indicated that freedom of speech and of the press
would allow citizens to give their opinions freely, making the use of instructions unnecessary. Id.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 82.
52. See generally id. (discussing the control of factions).
53. It is not coincidental that the statesmen of the late eighteenth century often linked delibera-
tion with the good of the whole community. Representative Hartley, in the debate on the instruc-
tion'amendment, implied that deliberation was fundamental to accomplish the goals of the Pream-
ble, to "form a more perfect union, provide for the common defence, and promote the general
welfare." I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 46, at 762. For further discussion on the role of public
virtue in republican government, see Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1550, 1554-55.
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Although the authors of the Constitution did not view Congress as a demo-
graphic mime of the electorate,54 they apparently believed that some similarity
was necessary for legitimate representation. The constitutional provisions of
frequent elections and residency requirements achieved this similarity.!" But
theoretically, a representative's similarity to her constituents could hinder de-
liberative independence from parochial concerns." After all, a representative
who was unduly attached to local interests would not be able to effectively
consider the national interest.
The federalist role for legislative similarity, and the need for representative
legitimacy, are partially revealed by the mechanics of deliberation itself: al-
though not a predetermined decision-making formula, local experience and the
opinions of constituents are a legitimate starting point for the deliberative pro-
cess.5 7 Thus, a legislator is expected to be familiar with district circum-
stances58-including those of political minorities-because he represents the
entire district, not just the majority coalition that elected him."
D. Representative Legislation-The Role of Constitutions
In summary, the constitutional text and history teach that representation by
Congress should be legitimate: its members should be elected by the people,
54. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1028.
55. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James
Madison), supra note 10, at 327 ("Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which
[the House's dependence on the people] can be effectually secured.").
56. Perhaps Madison was referring to the chaos of parochial state legislatures in asking, "Does
[the advantage of the Union over the States] consist in substitution of representatives whose en-
lightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to the local prejudices and to
schemes of injustice?" THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 83-84 (em-
phasis added).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 56 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 348. Madison stated:
The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowl-
edge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably
in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the
State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assem-
bled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the
legislature of the United States.
Id. Constituent desires probably will not exist for every legislative issue. When they do exist, they
should be used as part of the formula for making a decision. Under this system, a representative's
actions will probably conform to her constituents' desires. When this is not the case, the represen-
tative should be able to offer a reasonable explanation such as lack of constituent information on
the issue. See HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209-40 (1967). Deliberation
is the process by which rational explanations are formulated for legislative decisions.
58. "By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little
acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests." THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison), supra note 10, at 83 (emphasis added).
59. Publius emphasized the importance of considering minority rights in despairing that "the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, [and] measures are too often decided,
not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of




meet residency requirements, and proportionally represent the people (or
states in the case of the Senate). Furthermore, Congress should make effective
law that embraces the national interest by legislating within a framework of
legitimacy and deliberation.
Realizing the susceptibility of representative government to the influence of
self-interested factions,60 the Framers sought to protect congressional legiti-
macy and effectiveness by inserting controls into the plan of government it-
self-the Constitution. Publius asserted in The Federalist:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue,
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most
effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold
their public trust. 1
Among the Constitution's "effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous"
were the requirements of frequent popular election, residency, and propor-
tional representation discussed above. Publius also argued that the Constitu-
tion's jurisdiction over such a large republic would cause localized factions to
cancel each other out. 2 The separation of powers would also allow the very
branches of the government to prevent each other from usurping power for
selfish reasons.63 In theory, the resulting stalemate would force Congress into
deliberative, effective lawmaking.
But suppose that at some future time in the Republic, the people discover
that these controls are not enough to guarantee that representative legislation
is both legitimate and effective. If the Constitution's purpose is to control rep-
resentatives to ensure effective government envisioned in the Preamble, the
example of America's Founding experience may imply a right and duty of the
people to change constitutional controls when the old ones falter. Today, Con-
gress has lost much of its representative legitimacy, and its legislation is inef-
fective. However, changing the constitutional controls of government can rem-
edy these problems-by setting constitutional limits on congressional tenure.
II. MODERN CONGRESSIONAL MALFUNCTIONS
This section of the Article argues that the problems of congressional legiti-
macy and effectiveness are the result of institutional incentives that encourage
members of Congress to engage in ineffective, factional lawmaking. In fact,
60. "Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by
corruption or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the peo-
ple." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 82. Undoubtedly, the Framers
were more keenly aware of the influence of factions after experiencing the instructionist period of
the early state governments described above. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 350-51.
62. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 83 (discussing
how large republics minimize the influence of individual factions).
63. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (James Madison) (exploring the separation of
powers doctrine).
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this section presents individual members of Congress as a collective faction
with its own special interest: reelection. 64
A. Effects of the Reelection Incentive
By being elected, modern congresspersons meet the formal requirements of
popular authorization. Representatives also might argue that their electoral
dependence implies a duty to do what the people "want."6 5 Interestingly, how-
ever, much of what modern constituents seem to "want" has no immediate
connection to what we normally think of as legislation. For example, commen-
tators have argued that representatives' desire to be reelected encourages them
to do casework66 and advertising,6" which arguably have little to do with legis-
lation." The reelection incentive also encourages congresspersons to do things
we typically think of as more traditional legislative activities, like pork-barrel-
ing69 and influence peddling.7 0 While congresspersons reply that these activi-
64. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISH-
MENT (1977) (arguing the existence of the "Washington Establishment"); DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (analyzing congressmen as "single minded seek-
ers of reelection").
65. Hanna Pitkin argues that representation does not imply that a representative should auto-
matically and mechanically do what constituents "want." See PITKIN, supra note 57, at 214-15.
Rather, a representative should base legislative decisions on constituents' best overall interests,
which the representative may know because she has more information (perhaps obtained through
deliberation). Constituent wants and interests will usually coincide, but when they do not, a repre-
sentative should be free to make a choice based on the best information about the people's inter-
ests. Id. at 217. A choice that goes against constituent wishes requires a reasonable explanation,
but should not be prohibited. Id.
66. Casework, or constituent service, is a simplified term for the bureaucratic "unsticking" ac-
tivities that members of Congress perform for constituents (e.g., procuring delayed social security
checks or tax refunds). FIORINA, supra note 64, at 42-45.
67. Formal and informal advertising can include "frequent visits to the constituency, nonpoliti-
cal speeches to home audiences, the sending out of infant care booklets and letters of condolence
and congratulation." MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 49-52. Incumbents also have frequent access to
broadcast and print media, including (for some) regular television and radio programs, Id.;
FIORINA, supra note 64, at 19 (noting how incumbents use the growing pool of media sources to
lengthen their stay in office).
68. Admittedly, dialogue between representatives and constituents concerning policy could be
characterized as "advertising," but it is also clear that much advertising has nothing to do with
policy-making.
69. Pork-barreling is the procurement of a high-profile federal project for which a congressper-
son can claim credit in the home district. See FIORINA, supra note 64, at 41-42.
70. Influence peddling is where a congressperson trades influence (including constituent service)
or policy support to get campaign contributions or some other reelection support. This has been
facilitated by the decentralization of power in Congress. See FIORINA, supra note 64, at 62-70;
MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 92-97. Influence peddling often results in campaign support from
sources outside the congressperson's home district. MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 57.
The well-publicized case of the "Keating Five" senators is an example of influence peddling
that included the "sale" of "constituent service." In the Keating Five case, Charles Keating made
substantial campaign contributions to five senators, four of whom represented other states, who
then influenced a regulatory agency on behalf of Keating's savings and loan institution, which was
under investigation by the agency. John R. Cranford, Keating Hearings Take Senate Into Thick
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ties strengthen their ties with the people, the following argument shows that
pork-barreling and influence peddling seriously frustrate legislative legitimacy
and effectiveness.
1. Impact on Representative Legitimacy
Pork-barreling allows a disproportionate allocation of federal projects to the
districts of the more senior members of Congress. This allocation undermines
proportional representation, as it makes the political voices of similarly sized
groups of citizens radically different. The fact that senior, influential congress-
persons may procure bigger slices of the pie does not, by itself, prove the exis-
tence of unequal distribution of influence or federal funding. In theory, every
district will have a senior representative once in a while, so pork-barreling
should balance out in the long run. Yet the fact that the Speaker of the House
hailed from either Texas or Massachusetts for a period spanning almost half
of the last century convincingly undercuts the "balance over time"
argument.71
Advertising, much of which is done at government expense,72 franking,73
staff privileges, trip allowances, and office resources give incumbents a tremen-
dous resource lead in elections.74 To the extent that they are elected, incum-
bents do get their authority from the voters-but with a big hand from the
national treasury.75 Perhaps incumbents deserve this advantage because of
their expertise and the efficient way they manage the business of lawmaking.
However, one could maintain that such a significant resource pool damages
the notion that an incumbent's authority is firmly based on popular
sovereignty.76
Another result of the effective7 7 reelection efforts of congresspersons is long
of S&L Swamp, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3787 (1990).
71. Except for six years when Carl Albert, an Oklahoman, served as Speaker, the House's top
position during the 50 years from 1940 to 1989 was held by either a representative from Texas
(Sam Rayburn and Jim Wright) or Massachusetts (Joseph Martin, John McCormack, and Tip
O'Neill). CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 590-94 (102d Cong. 1990-91).
72. See MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 52.
73. Franking is the sending out of "official" mail to constituents at the taxpayers' expense.
FIORINA, supra note 64, at 19.
74. This resource advantage was estimated at nearly $500,000 in 1975. HERBERT E. ALEXAN-
DER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 55 (1976).
75. Advertising resources are especially valuable when one considers the importance of mere
name and face recognition in modern elections.
76. Campaign finance reform and proposals to limit congressional tenure certainly evidence the
perception of a problem.
77. Reelection rates certainly indicate that incumbents' electorally motivated activities are
working. In 1990, 31 out of 32 incumbent senators were reelected, a winning percentage of
96.9%, while 392 of 407, or 96.3 % of House incumbents won. The total turnover in the House in
1990, including retirements, was only 10%. 1990 Election Results, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
3797 (1990). Data from elections over the last 10 years indicate that this high reelection rate is
commonplace. See More and More, House Races Aren't Races But Runaways, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1987, at Al.
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tenure."8 Arguably, long tenure contradicts Article I residency requirements79
for members of Congress, because incumbents do not really come from the
states and districts they represent, but rather from the District of Columbia.6
Thus, long-term members of Congress may lose touch with the experiences
and the problems of people at home. To the extent that these local experiences
are relevant to deliberation, long tenure also damages legislative effectiveness.
Long tenure also prevents the participation of many competent and energetic
(including ethnically diverse) citizens in the legislative process, preserving
Congress as the quintessential "old boys' club."
2. Influences on Legislative Effectiveness
a. General effects of the reelection incentive
Despite whatever value excessive casework and advertising may have for
cultivating connections between Congress and the people, these activities ar-
guably waste time and money that could be used for research and discussion
of policy issues.81 These extra-legislative activities may also divert voters' at-
tention from representatives' substantive positions on policy.82 Thus, congress-
persons may gain even more flexibility to sell support for specific programs to
interest groups in exchange for campaign money.
Furthermore, influence peddling exacerbates political and economic dispari-
ties between interest groups. It is obviously more difficult for poorer (and often
less educated) groups to mobilize lobbying efforts, but it is far from clear that
their needs and preferences are less important than the preferences of more
affluent and influential groups. Although not provable by empirical data, it is
at least more likely that needy, immobilized groups will receive more benefits
from a Congress that emphasizes reasoned discussion and public virtue over
reelection strategies.
b. More specific impacts on effectiveness
One specific example of how the reelection incentive hinders lawmaking is
seen in the field of federal tax law. Most people have recognized for some time
that much of the complexity (and perceived unfairness) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code is caused by the lobbying of special interests to get self-serving pro-
78. House members leaving office between 1975 and 1985 had average tenures of nearly 12
years. Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEx.
L. REv. 967, 976 (1988). Average House tenure in the 100th Congress was 10.3 years. Id.
79. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
80. See Amar, supra note 41, at 1080-81 (noting that congresspersons spend most of their time
together "in a one industry town of lawyers and power brokers-a lifestyle hardly 'representative'
of the average citizen").
81. FIORINA, supra note 64, at 41 (arguing that lawmaking is Congress' primary responsibil-
ity); see supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (same).
82. Voters may be more aware of congressional voting on large social programs, like social
security, which attract more constituent attention. However, most voters are relatively ignorant of
roll-call voting records. See Tushnet et al., supra note 78, at 978.
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visions inserted into the Code.83 This lobbying succeeds because numerous
congressional committee members with influence over tax legislation, who are
also anxious to be reelected, push the right legislative buttons for special inter-
ests, who reciprocate by making campaign contributions. The end result is a
federal tax policy that is overly complicated by special rates, exemptions, and
deductions for numerous special interests. But note that special interests, being
self-interested by definition, cannot really be blamed for the problem. Nor can
Congress fairly shoulder all of the blame. The main cause of our convoluted
tax code is the reelection incentive, which robs legislators of the deliberative
will to make unbiased decisions about proposed tax rules. 84
The reelection incentive also has severe implications for overspending. 5
Since no single congressperson can be blamed for bad fiscal policy, each mem-
ber has an incentive to maximize her own short term career goals and reelec-
tion strategies by doing two things: (1) procuring government projects for her
home district;8  and (2) supporting spending programs for groups whose inter-
ests are affected by her committees.8 7 Representatives also seem to have a
more general tendency to resist tax increases while approving more spending. 88
In the end, the present system favors the overlegislation of small spending pro-
grams and federal projects for which legislators can take credit electorally.
Unfortunately, the system hinders the resolution of critical national issues as
large and important to the "general Welfare" as the budget deficit.
83. See, e.g., Christy E. Milner, Resolving Producer/Interest Questions Under the Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax, 37 TAx LAW. 607, 620-21 (1984) (explaining special interests as a partial
cause of complexity of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980); Anthony D'Amato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1983) (observing that lobbying by special interests leads the
legislative process to produce convoluted, "uncertain" law). But cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Section
4975 and PTE 77-9: The Causes of Complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, 15 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 1, 40-41 (1981) (arguing that the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code is not due to
special interests, but rather to Congress' tendency to make the tax law more objective in order to
make it more readily enforceable).
84. While acknowledging that part of the complexity of the tax law may be caused by special
interests, one author has pointed out that congressional efforts to reform the Code and "strengthen
the IRS against the abuse of exempt entities" has actually led to greater complexity of the Code.
Zelinsky, supra note 83, at 40-41. Thus, Zelinsky would probably argue that eliminating the re-
election incentive would not eliminate all complexity. However, a truly deliberative Congress
might be able to simplify the Code to the point that complicated enforcement provisions would
also be unnecessary.
85. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1077 (1985) (arguing that the popular movement to call a constitutional convention to con-
sider possible amendments to control federal budget deficits is "wise and enlightened").
86. FIORINA, supra note 64, at 41, 73, 82.
87. One author goes further, arguing that members of Congress are socialized into approving
the individual appropriation for almost any given program. He also points out that while the
reelection incentive may be the major socializing mechanism, this "brainwashing" is so thorough
that even retiring legislators continue to vote for almost any spending package. James L. Payne,
The Congressional Brainwashing Machine, 100 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (1990).
88. See id. at 5 (noting Congress' tendency toward spending); see also FIORINA, supra note 64,
at 73 (discussing ability of individual legislators to spend while avoiding responsibility for overall
budget problems); MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 128, 144-45 (same).
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Congress' glaring inability to work together to solve a snowballing national
problem-the budget deficit-was never more evident than during the budget
fiasco of October 1990.89 This experience demonstrates two lessons. First,
while everyone knows that the budget is sorely overburdened with hundreds of
spending programs of varying importance, individual representatives are com-
pletely unwilling to examine which or how many of these programs must be
jettisoned. The reason is clear. Some group, somewhere, is counting on each of
these programs. And several members of Congress probably used their influ-
ence to help each group get its program. In turn, these legislators were com-
pensated electorally." Representatives are simply unwilling to critically ex-
amine the programs upon which they depend to get reelected. They also
hesitate to examine other legislators' programs, because "what goes around
comes around"; that is, each individual congressperson must cultivate the
goodwill and support of other members to get her particular programs. Thus,
the reelection incentive ultimately thwarts responsible fiscal policy.9'
A second lesson learned from the 1990 budget fiasco may be even more
serious. Apparently, members of Congress as a collective body are willing to
protect their reelection empires by deceiving the general public about how bad
things really are. 2
B. Instruction Revisited?
An eighteenth-century commentator complained that state legislatures were
composed of "plain, illiterate husbandmen, whose views seldom extended far-
ther than to the regulation of highways, the destruction of wolves, wild cats,
and foxes, and the advancement of the other little interests of the particular
counties, which they were chosen to represent."" Although upon first impres-
89. See generally George Hager, Deficit Deal Ever So Fragile as Hours Dwindle Away, 48
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3574 (1990); Janet Hook, Budget Ordeal Poses Question: Why Can't Con-
gress Be Led?, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY, REP. 3471 (1990).
90. It is no answer to say that many lobbyists and PACs donate to the campaigns of many
different representatives, regardless of their party affiliation or stand on the issues. This practice is
clearly designed to build goodwill and merely feeds the general free-spending attitude in Congress.
91. If current fiscal policy reflects popular selfishness and an unwillingness to do with less, this
attitude may also reflect a belief among people that government is incapable of responsible long-
term leadership; thus, short-term selfishness is the only reasonable course of action. See, e.g.,
Charles A. Radin, At Core, Say Analysts, U.S. Suffers Crisis of Confidence, BOSTON GLOBE, July
2, 1990, at 1.
92. For instance, with all the hoopla in the fall of 1990 about the $500 billion "deficit-reduc-
tion" package, no one seemed very concerned about telling the public that the overall deficit is still
not shrinking, but is actually growing at a rate of about $300 billion a year. George Hager, One
Outcome of Budget Package: Higher Deficits on the Way, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3710 (Nov.
3, 1990). Indeed, Congress is no longer even concerned about the overall size of the deficit. Id.
Furthermore, the current "deficit-reduction" program does not require additional spending cuts to
offset a larger than expected deficit caused by a recession. In fact, "some analysts think a souring
economy could keep deficits near the $300 billion level indefinitely." Id.
93. WooD, supra note 27, at 195 (quoting William Smith, History of the Late Province New
York, from Its Discovery to ... 1762, in COLLECTIONS 309 (New York Historical Society ed.,
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sion it may seem absurd to compare modern representatives and senators to
"plain, illiterate husbandmen," the analogy actually is quite good. The only
difference is that the "wolves" and "wild cats" that concern modern congress-
persons are a plethora of special interests," including their own interest in
reelection. Thus, just as the Framers sought to create a Congress free from the
destructive influences of parochialism, we might well consider restructuring
Congress to address the problem of the reelection incentive.
III. IMPROVING THE LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONGRESS
Once one recognizes that the reelection incentive, at least in its modern con-
text, has a profoundly negative influence on representative legislation as envi-
sioned by the Constitution, the compelling conclusion is that something must
be done about it. Assuming that electorally motivated congresspersons can be
collectively thought of as something like a Madisonian faction, it is interesting
to note that "[tihere are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the
one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects." 95 Two possi-
ble strategies to combat the "effects" of reelection desire are campaign finance
regulation and judicial remedies.
A. Campaign Finance Regulation
Some have offered strict limits on campaign spending and contributions as a
way to lessen the incumbency advantage and restore electoral legitimacy. 96 By
reducing the incumbents' dependence on contributions from special interests,
this regulation would theoretically discourage incumbents from peddling influ-
ence or policy support for campaign funds. One attempt to remedy the prob-
lem has been to set limits on the amount a single contributor may donate to
one candidate.97
But special interest groups can circumvent contribution limits for individual
donors by giving to political action committees (PACs), which then direct
funds to designated incumbents. PACs are one of the major reasons why
1829).
94. In commenting on the inability of party leaders to impose discipline to support national
party policy goals, David Obey, chairman of the Democratic Study Group, stated, "Members
won't tolerate discipline. Campaign funding is dispersed and decentralized. We're being eaten
alive by the single-issue groups." Otto Friedrich, To Reform the System; Needed: Major
Changes in Government-but Not Constitutional Surgery, TIME, Feb. 23, 1981, at 32 (emphasis
added).
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 78.
96. See, e.g., Chuck Alston, The Election-Reform Debate Keeps Its Partisan Shape, 49 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 723 (Mar. 23, 1991) (discussing current proposals for campaign finance regula-
tion); Chuck Alston, Image Problems Propel Congress Back to Campaign Finance Bills, 49
CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 275, 277 (Feb. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Alston, Image Problems] (same).
President Bush also suggested the elimination of political action committees in his State of the
Union address for 1991. See Dowd, supra note 6, at Al.
97. Currently, individual contributors are limited to donations of $1000 per election. Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(l)(a) (1988).
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House incumbents in 1990 were able to raise an average of $385,000 to their
challengers' $83,000, an advantage of more than 4.5-to-i." Thus, meaningful
campaign finance laws should include a way to either eliminate PACs or to
regulate them closely." But just as PACs represent a way to get around limits
on individual contributions to incumbents (who are more influential than the
challengers, and thus more attractive targets of political "bribery"), clever
ways may also exist to circumvent the elimination or regulation of PACs. For
example, wealthy special interests may try to funnel large amounts of money
to incumbents by dispersing it among many small "facilitating" contributors,
who could then donate funds individually to avoid detection or regulation. In
addition, even without any PACs, congresspersons may feel obligated to do-
nors who contribute large amounts of money that are nevertheless within the
limit. Thus, it is hard to imagine extinguishing incumbents' desire to cater to
special interests while ignoring overall problems like the budget.
Even if PACs were eliminated and strict contribution limits and total expen-
diture caps were enforced, the electoral incentive would still induce incum-
bents to do casework, informal advertising, and pork-barreling, which hinder
well reasoned policy-making.100 If there are difficulties enforcing these cam-
paign finance regulations, incumbents will come out ahead due to their greater
ability to raise money in the first place.101 Incumbents also retain their office
resources, staff privileges, and media access. With these built-in advantages,
caps on total campaign spending may actually hurt, and not help, challengers
as challengers will be unable to spend the extra $500,000 to make up the
gap.102 Additionally, incumbents may still avoid necessary spending cuts and
98. If Money Talks, Mr. Smith Won't Go to Washington, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3756
(1990). Even more noteworthy is the fact that House incumbents raised $74.7 million in PAC
funds compared to only $4.7 million for challengers, an advantage of 16-to-1. Id. In the Senate,
incumbents in 1990 out-raised challengers by an average of $3.3 million to $1.3 million. The total
PAC advantage for incumbent senators was $26 million to $6.8 million. Id.
99. PAC contributions already are limited to $5000 per election. Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2). But a technique called "bundling," an inventive evasion of this
regulation, is already widely practiced, and was used extensively in the Keating scandal. With
bundling, "someone raises many individual contributions [including PAC contributions] and
hands them over in a lump sum designed to impress the politician." Alston, Image Problems,
supra note 96, at 277. Bundling is just one example of how loopholes in campaign finance laws
can be exploited to make regulation futile. This begs the question of how new campaign finance
regulation could make a significant difference.
100. See supra Part II.A (discussing problems with these activities).
101. As mentioned above, supra notes 96-97, enforcement problems will favor incumbents be-
cause they are more influential than challengers, who have relatively little political clout. Thus,
the presence of loopholes in campaign finance laws will mean more money for incumbents.
Incumbents also have resource and visibility advantages over challengers to reach out to broad
constituencies to get more contributions from small donors. For example, Representative Stephen
Solarz, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, has amassed an enor-
mous campaign war chest with donations from many small contributors, almost all of whom are
Asian-Americans living outside his Brooklyn, New York district. Chuck Alston, Solarz Looks
Abroad to Find Election Cash at Home, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 501 (1989).
102. A 1975 estimate valued an incumbent's office resources, staff, and advertising advantages
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tax increases for fear of offending revenue-conscious voters.
Another approach might be setting a cap on total campaign expenditures, or
requiring that campaigns be financed entirely with public funds. But the Su-
preme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that limiting the use of personal funds
and setting expenditure caps violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech."' 3 Thus, enacting these types of controls will require the Court to re-
think its position in Buckley or require a constitutional amendment.' 0' Finally,
one must remember in any discussion of campaign finance regulation that
Congress is the body that must promulgate these reforms. Unfortunately,
members of Congress have strong incentives to leave loopholes in the system
through which they may continue to draw the resources they need to remain
entrenched on the Hill.
B. Judicial Remedies
Traditional judicial remedies to cure pluralistic malfunctions that threaten
minority interests have included: (a) applying process-based analysis; 10 (b)
examining the fairness of election laws;106 and (c) ordering redistricting
plans." ' While these may have worked in the past, courts presently are un-
suited to remedy' 08 substantial deficiencies like "bad" fiscal policy.' 09 This is
in a Congressional campaign at $500,000. ALEXANDER, supra note 74,.at 55. When this amount is
added to the "official" fundraising figure of $385,000 for House incumbents in 1990, the "true"
incumbency advantage in the House is really $885,000 versus $83,300, a lead over challengers of
more than 10-to-I. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting how PACs create a fun-
draising advantage of 4.5-to-I in favor of incumbents).
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the plaintiff challenged the constitution-
ality of several amendments to the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act. These amendments (a)
limited the political contributions an individual or group could give to a federal candidate; (b)
restricted the general election campaign expenditures each candidate could make; and (c) re-
quired Political Action Committees to keep detailed records of any contribution or expenditure
which exceeded $10 dollars. Id. at 15-28. The United States Supreme Court found the record-
keeping provisions to be constitutional, and the campaign expenditure and contribution provisions
to be unconstitutional. Id. at 54, 67, 78. The Court reasoned that while the government had
substantial interests in informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political pro-
cess, Id. at 67, 78, the expenditure ceilings on individuals and candidates violated First Amend-
ment rights, id. at 39. The Court further found that the ceilings "placed substantial and direct
restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to engage in protected political
expression." Id. at 54.
104. Sunstein has argued that a "republican" approach to the First Amendment would result in
greater deference to these types of campaign finance laws. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1576-77.
105. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate-of the "Inside-Outsider",
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986) (arguing that the Carolene decision is neither process-based nor
particularly protective of minorities); Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (exploring the reason why scholars
continue to advocate "process-profiting" theories).
106. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Ju-
dicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1325 (1987) (arguing that the Court should
treat partisan gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 105 (criticizing effectiveness of process-based protection
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partly because judicial inquiries normally are limited to narrowly drawn facts
for the resolution of specific disputes. Thus, the only benefactors of judicial
intervention are specific litigants, not the broad range of groups whose inter-
ests may be slighted by the current system." 0
Although Publius concluded in The Federalist No. 10 that factions were
best controlled by regulating their effects, perhaps reelection-motivated con-
gresspersons can be dealt with by removing the cause of "bad" behavior. Since
the cause of this behavior is the desire to be reelected, one simple solution may
be to eliminate reelection. Although a constitutional amendment limiting con-
gresspersons to one term in each house may seem like a drastic measure, it is
the best way to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of representative leg-
islation mandated by the Constitution. The balance of this Article will argue
that one-term tenures are both reasonable and workable.
IV. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING TENURE
The idea of tenure limits for legislators is not new. This section will review
antifederalist opposition to the absence of tenure limits in the Federal Consti-
tution. A brief survey and analysis of some more recent proposals for congres-
sional term limits will follow.
A. Eighteenth-Century Thought on "Rotation"
Mechanically limited legislative (and executive) tenure, otherwise known as
"rotation," dates back to the late eighteenth century when the drafters first
began to write state constitutions. The abandonment of term limits in the Fed-
eral Constitution surprised many people who had earlier attached great impor-
tance to rotation as a primary principle of republican government."'
Advocates of rotation viewed the system as a way to maintain legislative
similarity and proximity because newly elected representatives would be more
likely to share the concerns and preferences of the people. Rotation also would
allow many people to participate as actual legislators. This "hat passing" pro-
vided first-hand experience with the reins of government. Gilbert Livingston, a
delegate at the New York convention, asserted that congresspersons "should
not only return, and be obliged to live with the people, but return to their
former rank of citizenship.""" George Mason, Virginia Governor and delegate
under Carolene Products); Schuck, supra note 106 (criticizing judicial intervention in politics,
particularly partisan politics).
109. See Amar, supra note 31, at 1285 n.9.
110. See id. at 1285 n.12.
111. Thomas Jefferson stated, "[Another] feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandon-
ment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office .... " Thomas Jefferson, Letter From
Jefferson to Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 2 THE WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330, 330 (H. A.
Washington ed., 1853).
112. KENYON, supra note 28, at 391 (quoting Gilbert Livingston). Antifederalist penman
"Montezuma," writing sarcastically as if a proponent of the Constitution, "exulted" that the ab-
sence of rotation would prevent "the representatives from mixing with the lower class," thus pre-
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to the Philadelphia Convention, remarked that "[niothing is so essential to the
preservation of a republican government as a periodical rotation,"'13 presuma-
bly referring to both the participatory benefits and legislative controls afforded
by limited tenure.
A deep mistrust of power underlay the antifederalist concern about the ab-
sence of rotation from the Constitution. They felt that "the predominant thirst
of dominion . . . has invariably and uniformly prompted rulers to abuse their
power." 4 Thus, during the state ratifying conventions, the Antifederalists
predicted two ill effects. First, incumbents would abuse congressional perqui-
sites to circumvent free elections and ensure life tenure.115 Then, congressper-
sons would become a political and social aristocracy with little in common
with the people. 6
Additionally, the Antifederalists viewed the Constitution's legislative con-
trols of residency requirements and frequent elections as grossly inadequate
weapons for taming the national rulers' lust for power. Patrick Henry con-
tended, "The only semblance of a check is the negative power of not re-elect-
ing them. This, sir, is but a feeble barrier, when their personal interest, their
ambition and avarice, come to be put in contrast with the happiness of the
people.'1 17
In contrast, the Federalists argued that the regular election of the House
and Senate would be sufficient to restrict tenure "for a limited period," even if
tenure were not explicitly set at "a period of years" as it was in many state
constitutions.'1 8 In response to the antifederalist charge that representatives
would continually be reelected, much like the delegates to Congress under the
Articles of Confederation, Publius responded, "They [meaning the delegates
under the Articles] are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is con-
sidered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election
serving the rulers' power while limiting participation of the lower classes. Id. at 62. Montezuma
was an unidentified author of "strong feelings [with] much talent for inflammatory propaganda"
during the ratification debates. Id.
113. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA, IN
1787, at 485 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (quoting George
Mason, June 14, 1788).
114. Id. at 436 (statement of Patrick Henry).
115. It was believed that Congress' power would result in the "security of their reelection...
amount~ing] nearly to an appointment for life." See KENYON, supra note 28, at 390-91 (quoting
Gilbert Livingston at the New York ratifying convention, June 24, 1788); see also id. at 396
(noting the fear that the Senate would become a body of permanent representatives).
116. Antifederalist writers "Centinel" and "John DeWitt" argued that the reelection of power-
ful rulers would create an aristocracy. Id. at 89.
117. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 113, at 167 (quoting Patrick Henry, June 9, 1788).
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 10 at 241. Interestingly, Publius
argued here that being authorized by the people and serving "for a limited period" were defining
characteristics of representatives in a republic. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James
Madison), supra note 10, at 316 ("The members of the legislative department ... are numerous.
They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections ... embrace a great
proportion of ... society.").
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of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same prin-
ciple." '' Thus, the Federalists did not seem to think that long tenure would
be the ruL under the new Constitution.
Placed in historical context, the Framers' rejection of tenure limits may
have been based partially on a fear that rotating legislators would not have
sufficient deliberative independence from the people, and that members of
Congress might be more likely to be instructed by local interests. It is ironic
that modern "instruction" of Congress by pressure from interest groups stems
from the existence of reelection (or more precisely, the desire to be reelected),
rather than its absence. Given the federalist emphasis on deliberative freedom
from factions, one must speculate that the Framers may have considered ten-
ure limits had they faced the problems with the reelection incentive prevalent
today.
If, on the other hand, the Federalist rejection of tenure limits was related to
an elitist skepticism about popular participation in government, 120 the Antifed-
eralists may be teaching a different republican heritage. Antifederalist litera-
ture on rotation emphasizes that widespread citizen participation is an integral
part of effective and legitimate representation. 1
B. Recently Proposed Limits on Congressional Tenure
Since the First Congress, there have been a number of proposals in Con-
gress to limit tenure, but more than three quarters of these have come since
1970.112 Most of the proposed amendments within the last fifteen years came
during the late 1970s' 23 and then again in the late 1980s and 1990s.114 These
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 53 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 335 (emphasis added).
120. Charles Beard argued, for example, that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were
largely men who were creditors and had extensive property interests which they hoped to protect
by the adoption of a new government. Thus, they had an interest in preventing the people at
large--debtors and lessees-from participating in the ratification process. See generally CHARLES
A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1941). Commenting on the participation of the people in the ratification process, Beard
concluded:
[T]he disfranchisement of the masses through property qualifications and ignorance
and apathy contributed largely to the facility with which the personalty-interest rep-
resentatives carried the day. The latter were alert everywhere, for they knew, not as a
matter of theory, but as a practical matter of dollars and cents, the value of the new
Constitution.
Id. at 251.
121. Interestingly, despite the lack of tenure limits, a populist belief in participative lawmaking
resulted in relatively short average tenure for congressmen almost until the twentieth century. See
generally Robert Struble Jr., House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation. 94 POL. Sci. Q. 649
(1979-80) (analyzing the principle of rotation through a statistical breakdown of House of Repre-
sentative turnovers from 1824 to 1976). Thus, elements of the antifederalist philosophy seem to
have been part of the American political psyche for some time after the Constitution was ratified.
122. SULA P. RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL TENURE: A
REVIEW OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT HOUSE AND SENATE SERVICE 6 (Sept. 13, 1989).
123. See id. at 15. Most of the proposed amendments at this time were limits of 12 years or
more for both the House and Senate. A few proposals included provisions for lengthening the
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proposals suggest multi-term limits of from two to nine terms for senators and
representatives, while limiting total tenure to anywhere from about nine to
eighteen years. None of these proposals, of course, has ever come to a full vote
of the House or Senate for formal proposal as a constitutional amendment, 120
and none has suggested a one-term limit for all members. 26
In predicting how these proposed amendments might affect congressional
legitimacy and effectiveness, one is struck by the fact that the average tenure
limit proposed by these amendments is about twelve years, which is close to
the current average tenure of current members of Congress.127 Of course, av-
erage tenure would probably decrease under a twelve-year limit because there
would be no long (meaning over twelve-year) tenures to factor into the aver-
age. But it will still be possible for a member of Congress to spend twelve
years in Washington as a representative (and perhaps twelve more as a senator
under some proposals) despite damage to representative legitimacy caused by
a lack of real life experience in the district. On the positive side, these propos-
als would equalize seniority, thus encouraging the sharing of congressional
leadership positions-and political power-among districts and states. Over
time, this arrangement would strengthen proportional representation in
Congress.
However, these proposals fail to fully comprehend the destructive influence
of the reelection incentive.'22 There is no good reason to expect members of
Congress io do less to be reelected (within these multi-term limits) than they
do now. This is especially true when former representatives may run for the
Senate and vice versa. Given that more than half of all members of the House
in the 100th Congress had tenures of between three and six terms, 129 and as-
suming they engaged in average amounts of electorally motivated activities to
be reelected from two to five times, why would they act any differently when
House term to three or four years. See infra note 124 (listing and describing the various proposed
amendments).
124. See. e.g., S.J. Res. 235, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S157 (daily ed. Jan. 23,
1990) (proposing 12-year limit on House and Senate); H.R.J. Res., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REc. E2246 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (proposing limit of three four-year terms for House,
two six-year terms for Senate); H.R.J. Res., 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. El 148 (daily
ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (same); H.R.J. Res. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E1396 (daily
ed. May 4, 1988) (proposing three two-year terms for the House, and one six-year term for the
Senate); S.J. Res. 79, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S2944 (Mar. 10, 1987) (proposing
a 14-year limit on House, and a 12-year limit on Senate); H.R.J. Res. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
131 CONG. REC. E335 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1985) (proposing six three-year terms for the House,
three six-year terms for the Senate, and one six-year term for the President).
125. See John Biskupic, Congress Snaps to Attention Over New Flag Proposal, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1877, 1880 (1990) (listing all proposed constitutional amendments that have come to
a vote in one or both chambers of Congress since 1965).
126. See supra notes 123-24 (discussing proposals to limit congressional tenure before Congress
in the late 1970s, late 1980s, and 1990s).
127. See Tushnet et al., supra note 78, at 981 (noting that the average tenure of the 100th
Congress is 10.3 years).
128. See supra Part II (discussing the effects of the reelection incentive).
129. Tushnet et al., supra note 78, at 981.
1991]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
limited to twelve total years in the House, followed by a possible twelve years
in the Senate? This is very similar to what members of Congress do now any-
way.130 Thus, it remains doubtful that any significant improvements in con-
gressional legitimacy or effectiveness would result from a multi-term limit like
those mentioned here.
The following Part argues that limiting members of Congress to one term in
each House is a workable solution that avoids many of the problems described
above, including those that would remain under a multi-term limit.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL TENURE To ONE TERM
A. Outline of Proposed Constitutional Changes'
Under -the proposed plan, members of the House of Representatives will be
limited to a single term of four years. Terms will be staggered so that one half
of the total House membership will be elected every two years (a 50% turno-
ver every two years; a 100% turnover every four years). Senators will be lim-
ited to one term of eight years. The Senate will retain a staggered election
pattern, so that one-fourth of the whole Senate will be elected every two years
(a 25% turnover every two years; a 100% turnover every eight years).
Although no individual may serve more than one term in each House, for-
mer representatives and senators will be eligible to run for the other House
after waiting at least four years from the expiration of their first term.
B. An Institutional Effect: The Enhanced Role of Parties
As an immediate effect of a one-term limit, one might expect legislative
power to be more equally distributed-in terms of proportional equality. In
other words, without the influence of congressional seniority to skew the bal-
ance of political power, each district would have a relatively equal voice in
legislation. But what then? If every member of Congress acted as if she repre-
sented one little faction, there might be a danger that absolutely nothing will
be accomplished. Unaccountable one-time congresspersons could use their
130. See supra Part II (noting how reelection activities harm republican lawmaking under the
current theory). National substantive lawmaking would probably remain ineffective because of
members' incentives to work in particularized benefits. See Tushnet et al., supra note 78, at 981.
For other sources discussing limits on congressional tenure, see An Old Issue: Limited Number
of Terms, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H9464 (Oct. 4, 1988); AMERICAN ENTERPRISES
INSTITUTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AND CON-
GRESSIONAL TERMS (1979) (analyzing historical background and current proposals for limiting
presidential and congressional terms); Hendrik Hertzberg, Twelve is Enough: A Simple Cure for
Chronic Incumbency; Limiting Congressional Terms, NEw REPUBLIC, May 22, 1990, at 22.
131. While this Article is not first in suggesting a one-term limit, no serious constitutional
analysis of such a proposal has been undertaken previously. See generally Jack Douglas, Reining
in the Imperial Congress, REASON, Aug. 1984, at 31 (arguing for congressional term limits);
Elliott, supra note 85 (mentioning one 12-year term for the Senate as a possible budgetary solu-
tion); Theodore H. Smith, Entrenchment-A Budget Problem, DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, June
1989, at 31 (condemning congressional activities and briefly mentioning a one-term limit).
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power to secure whatever political or social benefits are available "to make
hay while the sun shines."
On the other hand, public-spirited citizens might fill the ranks of Congress,
not for the cynical purpose of building electorally dependent careers like many
of the current members of Congress, but rather to apply their virtue and elec-
toral independence to make deliberative, public-regarding law to benefit the
whole. However, common sense suggests that it is naive to think most mem-
bers of Congress will set aside personal ambitions and self-interest to concen-
trate on solving national problems.
If self-interested members rule the day, they probably will not be able to
build sufficiently cohesive coalitions to solve complex problems like the budget
deficit. Individual members may be pulled in so many directions that little will
be accomplished. In fact, a one-term limit might actually exacerbate exactly
what it seeks to eliminate: bare, self-interested factionalism.
However, another factor suggests a more positive outcome: political parties.
Political parties by their nature must attract broad bases of support to gain
control of institutions like Congress and the Presidency.3 Thus, a one-term
limit coupled with the existence of a stable party system might lead to a differ-
ent scenario than those posed above. First, individuals and interest groups (and
their respective candidates) will begin to choose party sides to take advantage
of the mobilizing abilities of the party machines.1 83 Eventually, all interest
groups and other politically active players will be forced to seek party support
to avoid the disadvantage of running against candidates affiliated with a party.
One advantage of parties is that they formulate unified platforms that address
both national and local interests.
One might speculate that once elected, it may be difficult to ensure that
"unaccountable" one-term legislators follow the party platform. But in fact,
each member would have strong incentives to follow the platform in exchange
for party support of that member's constituent or special interests.13" Addi-
tionally, first-time congresspersons will have incentives created by a desire for
future party support in running for the other House.138
This desire to serve again in Congress will not operate like the current re-
election incentive. Under the current system, incumbents do not need to follow
the party line to get reelected, because they can get plenty of donations by
132. See Fitts, supra note 41, at 1604.
133. One could argue that most interest groups have already chosen sides under the present
system (e.g., labor is democratic, business is republican). But despite superficial allegiances, inter-
est groups can readily obtain desired outcomes from the appropriate individual congressperson,
regardless of party. See FiORINA, supra note 64, at 75.
134. This support could include group access to the party platform, or party-supported nomina-
tion of group members to run for office.
135. It seems probable under this proposal that the Senate will be filled mostly with former
members of the House. Thus, the Senate will be a relatively experienced legislative body, with the
most senior members having as much as eight years of experience in Congress. Of course, most




servicing special interest groups. In addition, current incumbents gain electoral
support in the home district through casework, advertising, and pork-barreling.
With all of these reelection tools, incumbents can be party members in name
only, deserting the party on even the most important platform issues.
Although "reelection" is possible under the current proposal, a congressper-
son must wait four years before running for the other House. Assuming that
constituents and interest groups will have relatively short political memories,
members of Congress will not benefit electorally from traditional reelection-
related activities. Even if they do get some future support from interest groups
or constituents with good memories, this will be small and attenuated com-
pared to the party support they could procure by working together to help the
party solve national problems. Thus, the term limits proposed here will proba-
bly lead to a stronger party system that will in turn solidify policy opinion
through the party platforms." 6
C. Effects of a One-Term Limit on Legitimacy
A one-term limit will greatly improve congressional legitimacy. First, legis-
lators for any given term will always come directly from among the people of
their district or state, strictly satisfying the residency requirements of Article
1,137 and bringing fresh experience to mix into the deliberative recipe.
Next, the incumbency advantage in elections will disappear. Although for-
mer senators or representatives will often be matched against newcomers, they
will have been out of service for at least one intervening election, preventing
the use of congressional perquisites from overemphasizing the true value of
experience. Participation in Congress will necessarily increase, affording ser-
vice opportunities to many more people. Although pork-barreling will probably
continue, the rewards will be evenly dispersed because of the parity of senior-
ity among districts. 38
Term limits will enhance widespread popular participation in government,
which was stressed by the Antifederalists as essential for representative legiti-
macy. This is because a greater number of people will take part in the political
process generally, due to a greater popular affinity for Congress. Many more
people probably will know personally those who have either run for or served
in Congress at one time or another." 9 Further, at election time people will be
136. In some ways, a government with a limit on congressional tenure will resemble the parlia-
mentary system, in which voters base electoral decisions upon a party's national platform, and the
success of that party at solving national problems.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 3, cl. 3.
138. This enhances representation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This would be true even
for "incumbent" senators who have already served as representatives, because seniority will not
transfer from one House to the other.
139. Madison argued that House members ought to be acquainted with the people in general.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 316. Although it is an unverifi-
able empirical claim that more people will know current and former House members, logic argues
that a much wider array of people (with their proportionately diverse family and social contacts)
will at least consider running for Congress. It is logical to assume that a greater number of people
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forced to focus more on issues than images, as the cast of candidates will be in
constant flux. Voters will have to evaluate candidates' policy proposals rather
than automatically voting for an incumbent.
Further, many more and different people will have direct access to the legis-
lative process by actually serving or at least running for Congress. If public
financing of congressional campaigns were adopted along with term limits,
qualified candidates from socioeconomically depressed backgrounds would
have greater opportunities to run successfully.
From the perspective of participation, a rotating legislature has much in
common with the perfect theoretical jury. Interestingly, "pure" juries that are
chosen by lot"" are good models of representation."" They are composed of a
cross-section of political equals who serve for a limited time and engage in
deliberative decision-making on specific issues, all with an eye toward acting in
the common good of the community.
Alexis de Tocqueville argued that jury service is "highly beneficial to those
who judge [lawsuits]," in that people are educated in the law, and it is demys-
tified for them."" He also believed that juries strengthened the character of
the people, because they "communicate the spirit of the judges to the mind of
all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest
preparation for free institutions. It imbues all classes with a respect for the
thing judged and with the notion of right.""" Thus, the jury teaches people to
take responsibility in dealing with real societal problems. Similarly, a rotating
Congress would be both an educator and an instiller of societal values, because
many more and different people would have the chance to serve or have con-
tact with those who had served. It might also help us as a nation to take more
responsibility for societal problems.
D. More Effective Legislation
1. Effects Independent of Parties
Under the one-term proposal, politicians will save both time and money,
because there will be no incentive to do excessive casework and advertising.' 4'
Some may argue that this will lead to too little emphasis on these services.
However, personal and residential ties to the district will encourage members
of Congress to be attentive to constituents. 45 Furthermore, information dis-
will have more of a personal interest in the outcome of elections.
140. For purposes of analysis, I will assume that a "pure" jury is not subject to voir dire.
141. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1187-89
(1991).
142. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 296 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1st Am.
ed. 1945).
143. 1 id. at 295.
144. See FIORINA, supra note 64, at 59.
145. The connections of representatives to their districts, especially if one assumes more literal
adherence to constitutional residency requirements, will foster a "natural" accountability to the
inhabitants of the district. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 316.
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semination will continue through the media, but in the form of useful news
rather than campaign propaganda. 146 If the loss of casework is still a concern,
states or districts could set up ombudsman offices with connections to Congress
and the federal bureaucracy. 147 Term limits also will give legislators the elec-
toral freedom to deliberate and think about their votes and the use of their
political influence, which will lead to more principled decision-making than
under the current system, which encourages influence peddling, and even the
"selling" of constituent service to fill campaign coffers." 8
2. Greater Effectiveness With Parties
To the extent that parties are strengthened, the one-term limit will allow
Congress to effectively tackle broad, national issues, like the budget deficit and
poverty. This is because political parties, unlike individual politicians, will
Madison stated:
The members of the legislative department ... are distributed and dwell among the
people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance em-
brace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their
public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more
immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.
Id.
146. The franking privilege also will still exist, but could perhaps be used to communicate more
substantive policy information rather than image-building campaign fluff.
A related problem that may arise with term limits may be the incentive of sitting members of
Congress to advertise on behalf potential party successors. Although the First Amendment guar-
antees the right of incumbents to endorse candidates, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976),
the rules of ethics and conduct of both the House and the Senate can be read to prohibit the use
of congressional offices and staff in support of political candidates. See MANUAL AND RULES OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule XLV, at 679-80 (1982); SENATE MANUAL, STANDING RULES
OF THE SENATE Rule 38, at 68-69 (1979). Both House Rule XLV and Senate Rule 38 prohibit
members from maintaining or using "unofficial office accounts," proceeds from which are used to
defray unreimbursed office expenses. This means that members of Congress may not use their
offices for unofficial purposes (i.e., campaigning for themselves or someone else) and excuse them-
selves by covering the cost through an unofficial facilitating account. See, e.g., Point of Personal
Privilege-Charges Filed Before Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H13017, H13020 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (discussing Representative
Denny Smith's violation of House ethics rules by using congressional staff and office resources for
campaign fund solicitation).
147. One author suggests that citizen panels of 12 people, chosen by lot from the electorate,
might be placed strategically in federal agencies to monitor the actions of bureaucrats. Perhaps
they could also serve as liaisons for citizens' red tape problems. David Lempert, A Return to
Democracy. ch. 1 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor Akhil Amar, Yale Law
School).
148. The resolution of the Keating Five case illustrates the nonexistent conscience of many
lawmakers with respect to influence peddling. Although all five of the Keating senators had re-
ceived contributions from Keating and taken steps to influence an S&L regulatory investigation of
Keating's Lincoln Savings & Loan, four of the "Keating Five" escaped without any kind of disci-
pline. John R. Cranford, Decision in Keating Five Case Settles Little for Senate, 49 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 517 (Mar. 2, 1991). The Senate Ethics Committee's decision reveals an attitude
among lawmakers that they should be allowed to sell influence for money-something that clearly
would be illegal and punishable if reelection did not exist.
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have the necessary incentive and resources to solve these problems. Current
congresspersons have no incentive to solve broad societal problems, as no one
person can realistically claim credit for solving a national problem. However, a
party has incentives to tackle larger problems, because successful national pro-
grams will earn a party the popular support it needs to stay in power. When a
party's platform fails, control of the congressional agenda will pass to the
other party. 49
Another benefit of limited tenure will be healthier debates on the issues,150
both in the general public and in Congress. Strong political parties will help
focus and define policy debate. Party labels will actually mean something to
the average voter, leading to greater electoral participation, perhaps even
among the poor and less educated. 51 Additionally, the continual flux of talent
through the Capitol will ensure that policies do not stagnate. Thus, congres-
sional effectiveness will improve as deliberation increases in both Congress and
society in general.
E. The Power Balance: The President, Courts, and Bureaucracy
With stronger parties and fewer, if any, congressional demagogues, the
Presidency may be strengthened relative to Congress. Critics may argue that
this increases the possibility of tyranny. However, a healthy party system will
ensure that an alternative view is always available to check executive ex-
cesses.1 52 Congress will also retain the formal executive checks of the veto
override and the confirmation of executive appointees, along with the delibera-
tive power to apply these powers effectively.
Although legislation adopted by the new Congress may be presumptively
more deliberative and effective, the role of courts should not substantially
change. One must remember that even if Congress is more representative than
previously, it remains a mere stand-in for the people, and should not be
thought of as the people themselves.153 Judicial review can and should remain
available to prevent the reigning party from completely entrenching itself, or
trampling the rights of minorities.'5"
The death of the reelection incentive should lead to a more controlled and
efficient bureaucracy, as "cozy" triangles of legislators, lobbyists, and bureau-
crats are eliminated. 55 With a unified platform and electoral deliberative free-
149. See Fitts, supra note 41, at 1606-07
150. See generally Hertzberg, supra note 130 (arguing for a 12-year limit on congressional
terms).
151. See Fitts, supra note 41, at 1607-08.
152. See id. at 1610-12. See generally Hertzberg, supra note 130 (arguing that a 12-year term
limit will lead to a more effective opposition party to check the party in power).
153. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1028.
154. Id. at 1028-29. The Federalists also warned that an overabundance of power in the hands
of any body, even the people's representatives, could result in tyranny. THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(James Madison), supra note 10, at 301.
155. For a description of the interplay between these entities, see FIORINA, supra note 64, at
66-67. Critics of this proposal may counter that members' incentive to run for the other House
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doam, Congress should be able to eliminate some of the largesse from the
"Fourth Branch." Although federal agencies and affected industries will prob-
ably try to preserve their power, they will be forced to go to the parties for
help, and will have to justify their existence with reasons that will withstand
deliberative scrutiny. Otherwise, legislation that protects or favors these gov-
ernment agencies and related industries will not be a part of the party plat-
form. This will lead to more deliberative and effective policies than those influ-
enced by campaign checks from lobbyists.156
F. Arguments Against Limiting Tenure
1. Limiting the Choice of the People
Some argue that tenure limits prevent people from returning competent in-
cumbents to office. This is said to be an "anti-democratic perversion of popular
sovereignty. ' 157 Under the current system, however, voters have no choice but
to return incumbents to office. Although voters may recognize that incumbents
focusing on reelection create a deep, systemic problem with policy-making, it
is still consistent for voters to return their own incumbents to office. In effect,
the voters are faced with a prisoners' dilemma: removing a senior incumbent
will cost the district federal money and political clout vis-d-vis other districts.
The electorate is a hostage that must support the jailkeeper by reelecting its
incumbent.15 Thus, limiting tenure will actually create greater candidate
choice substantively, as a substantial number of new legislators bring new
ideas and experience to Congress every term.159
2. Loss of Experience and Expertise
A second criticism of term limits is the assertion that Congress will lose
valuable leadership experience and expertise. While it may be true that lead-
ers like Tom Foley, George Mitchell, and Dick Cheney are not developed over-
night, much of current legislators' expertise lies in the area of reelection-moti-
vated activities, which have little to do with substantive lawmaking. Without
the pressure of casework and campaigning, congresspersons will have more
will negate anticipated benefits. However, a four-year gap between terms of service should attenu-
ate the incentives of lobbyists affected by programs that may change dramatically in the interim.
156. See generally FIORINA, supra note 64, at 77-79 (discussing the weapons wielded by bu-
reaucrats against elected officials to protect their "kingdoms").
157. Nelson W. Polsby, Limiting Terms Won't Curb Special Interests, Improve the Legisla-
ture, or Enhance Democracy, Pun. AFF. REP., Nov. 1990, at 9 ("[T]erm limitations won't enhance
representative democracy. Just the opposite, since they create an artificial barrier preventing vot-
ers from returning to office legislators they might otherwise favor."); Why Put Deadlines on De-
mocracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at A30 (editorial) ("In limiting terms, it would limit and
dilute democracy."). Current members of Congress will surely be vocal advocates of this position.
158. See Jonathan A. Knee & Malcolm L. Stewart, Stop Me Before I Vote Again, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 1990, at A21 (op-ed).
159. No one could seriously argue that today's electorate has a meaningful choice when over
96% of incumbents who run are reelected. See 1990 Election Results, supra note 77.
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time and staff support to thoroughly research relevant policy issues, thus de-
veloping more policy-making expertise in a shorter time than current legisla-
tors. Further, parties will have an incentive to support the nomination of can-
didates who already are well qualified, and to train new legislators in
committee and other legislative duties, so that the party's national policy goals
will succeed. Finally, loss of experience and stability will be tempered by the
possibility of running for the other House, longer terms for representatives and
senators, and staggered elections. Under the limited tenure proposal, at any
given time at least seventy-five percent of the Senate and fifty percent of the
House will have had some legislative experience.
3. Loss of the Presidential Training Ground
A third argument against term limits is that it will destroy the training
ground for future presidential candidates. However, if one assumes that most
presidential candidates come from the Senate, and that they also will have
served at one time in the House, these candidates will have the benefit of
twelve years of federal lawmaking experience (because of the longer terms of
both representatives and senators). It is also probable that many candidates
will have both legislative and executive (gubernatorial) experience from work-
ing at the state level, both before and in between their terms in Congress.
Thus, most Presidential hopefuls probably will have well over twenty years of
experience in government, with twelve years in Congress.
4. Loss of Accountability
A final argument against tenure limits is the loss of accountability. If mem-
bers may not run for reelection, how can they be punished or rewarded by the
voters? As discussed above,160 congresspersons will have incentives to stick to
party platforms to secure party support for constituent interests and to leave
open the possibility of running for the other House later. Additionally, parties
will have incentives to support the nominations of qualified, intelligent, and
responsible candidates, because the success of the party's platform (and the
party's control of Congress) will depend on the competence of the party's
members in Congress. To protect against a particularly "bad" legislator who
blatantly ignores constituent interests after being elected, voters also could be
given a constitutional right of recall upon a two-thirds vote. This right could
become operative after a certain percentage of voters had signed a petition
supporting a recall.
A possible check against dishonesty in lawmaking could be the establish-
ment of strict bribery laws, and rules prohibiting the service of congressper-
sons on committees making policy in which they might have a financial or
direct professional interest. Additionally, members of Congress could be pro-
hibited from working for companies or in industries that were affected by leg-
160. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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islation a member worked on directly, much like "revolving door" laws appli-
cable to former Defense Department officials.1 6'
CONCLUSION
While the changes proposed here would substantially improve the legitimacy
and effectiveness of representative government, they will probably meet with
opposition, especially on the part of Congress itself. This presents an obvious
problem with an Article V amendment to the Constitution, because the nor-
mal amendment route is proposal by two-thirds of Congress, followed by ratifi-
cation by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Even if the other Article V
amendment route were pursued, that is, if two-thirds of the states called for a
constitutional convention, Congress' position and influence would remain a se-
rious obstacle to an amendment.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to propose an implementation
plan, several possibilities deserve mentioning. First, reforms could be at-
tempted at the state level before the federal level, similar to those already
proposed in California and Colorado.' 62 Once changes have been shown to be
161. See Defense Budget, House Passes $291 Billion Defense Budget; Procurement Integrity
Amendment Included, [1991] 55 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 21 (May 27, 1991); Revolving Door
Policy, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at D2. The "revolving door" statute prohibits certain Defense
Department employees and officials from participating in the procurement of Defense Department
contracts for at least two years from the date they resign from the Department. See 10 U.S.C. §
2397 (1988).
162. See Egan, supra note4, at Al; Robert Pear, 1990 Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990,
at A26. The Colorado Plan restricts the tenure of both state and federal legislators. See 5 COL.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 (West Supp. 1991); 18 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9 (West Supp. 1991). This
amendment passed by a margin of 71% to 29%, and is the only state law which limits the tenure
of federal legislators. See FACTS ON FILE, Nov. 11, 1990, at 1. The amendment provides:
(1) In order to broaden the opportunities for public service and
to assure that members of the United States Congress from Colorado are representa-
tive of and responsive to Colorado citizens, no United States Senator from Colorado
shall serve more than two consecutive terms in the United States Senate, and no
United States Representative from Colorado shall serve more than six consecutive
terms in the United States House of Representatives. This limitation on the number
of terms shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1991 ....
18 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9 (West Supp. 1991).
Other states have followed Colorado's lead. Both Oklahoma and California already have laws
that restrict the tenure of state legislators. Egan, supra note 4, at Al. In November, 1991, voters
from the following 21 states will determine whether to limit the tenure of state and/or federal
legislators: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1991, § C, at 13.
Recently the California Supreme Court found term limitations for state legislators to comport
with the Federal Constitution. See Legislature of California v. March Fong Eu, No. S019660,
1991 Cal. LEXIS 4529 (Cal. Oct. 10, 1991). The Legislature of California case concerned "The
Political Reform Act of 1990," an initiative referendum aimed at eliminating "career politicians,"
which was adopted on November 6, 1990. Id. at *11. The initiative contains three sections: (a)
restrictions on the retirement benefits of state legislators; (b) limitations on the state-financed
incumbent staff and support services of legislators; and (c) limitations upon the numbers of terms
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successful, public support could be mustered for amending the Federal Consti-
tution. Several writers also have suggested the possibility of amending the
Constitution outside of Article V-namely, by the people themselves. 163 After
all, who could be better than "the People" to make changes improving the
legitimacy and effectiveness of a government based on the authority of the
people?
state legislators could serve. Id. at *2-3.
In an unusual move, the California Supreme Court reviewed the case by asserting original
jurisdiction. Id. at *3. Although the court struck down the retirement benefit restrictions as an
"unconstitutional invalid impairment of contract," it held that the limitations, both on the number
of terms and on incumbent staff and services, were constitutional. Id. at *5-6. In balancing the
competing interests, the court reasoned that the state interests in restoring "free, fair and competi-
tive elections," in encouraging "qualified candidates to seek public office," and in eliminating "un-
fair incumbent advantages" overrode the infringement upon the incumbent's right to run for pub-
lic office and the voters' right to reelect the incumbent to that office. Id. at *41-42, 48.
A problem with Colorado's term limits for federal lawmakers is that they may violate the Fed-
eral Constitution. In fact, the constitutionality of the Colorado Plan currently is being litigated.
See Egan, supra note 4, at Al. But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Popular Sovereignty and Cola-
rado's Amendment Fire: A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional
Terms, 53 U. PiTT. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1991)). Another problem with this approach is that
even if Colorado's limits on federal legislative terms are constitutional, other states have a disin-
centive to follow suit because they risk losing both federal influence and money by giving up
seniority in favor of other states. Nevertheless, efforts by states like Colorado to limit congres-
sional terms are admirable because they generate important public dialogue on the issue of federal
term limits.
163. See generally Ackerman, supra note 7, at 1062 (noting that a possibility exists that "fu-
ture generations of Americans might, like the Federalists themselves, be called upon to elaborate
the higher law of 'We the People' of the United States through legally anomalous lawmaking
forms"); Amar, supra note 41 (arguing that "We the People" should enjoy "an unenumerated
right to amend our Constitution" outside Article V).
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